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RECENT BOOKS 
SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A NEW 
BRANCH OF SocIAL ScmNCE. By Fredrick K. Beutel. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. 1957. Pp. xvi, 440. $6. 
For so many years now one has heard of this wonderful jurispruden-
tial theory which, although perhaps originated by Continentals, was 
developed into an important contribution by American thinkers who 
often were referred to as sociological jurisprudents. The scientific in-
tentions and dispositions of these social engineers and juristic scientists 
continually gave promise that we were but steps away from the new age in 
law which would result from the adoption of the techniques and knowl-
edge developed in the more spectacular and successful sciences. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that one rather vigorously seizes upon Professor 
Beutel's book with its provocative title; for here there appears to be 
that first book-length treatment of law as a science. 
Before reading this work I had often puzzled as to what it could 
mean to say law is a science. After reading the book I have an idea what 
Professor Beutel means; this can be put in a somewhat homely fashion 
by saying that in law, as in life, it is generally useful and sometimes in-
dispensable to know what one is talking about. Before legislating about 
the planting of trees one should inquire of botanists as to the distance 
between trees which will result in the best stand of trees. Before legislat-
ing about the required sterilization of barber tools the effect of various 
disinfectants upon the cutting edges of scissors should be determined. 
When legislating about bad checks one should know, at least, how the 
business community responds to the passer of such checks and what officials 
can effectively do to reduce the loss from such checks. 
The second and larger part of experimental jurisprudence, to which we 
turn first, is devoted t~ a somewhat detailed analysis of the questions to 
which one should have answers when lawmaking about the passing of 
bad checks. There is also a terse description of attempts to study some 
other problems which have been graced with legislative attention: the 
planting of trees, the sterilization of barber tools, and the required size 
£or building bricks. It is, however, the bad check problem which is the sub-
ject of approximately one half the book. 
Professor Beutel is careful to point out that financial and other limi-
tations prevented him from making a full and proper study of the bad 
check problem, but he nonetheless gives the reader an enormous amount 
of detail on the statistical aspects of the study. In light of the fact that the 
study is intended only as an indication of a direction for research and in 
view of the £act that in a very few pages the results of the study could be 
given (pp. 405-406), I wonder why the reader is asked to follow the author 
over more than 50 pages of statistical machinations. 
As a result of the bad check study and other like attempts at Experi-
mental Jurisprudence (the author capitalizes the expression throughout the 
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book), Professor Beutel offers five "jural laws." (1) Laws are seldom en-
forced -literally. (2) In a changing society, inflexibility is likely to result 
in the death of a law. (3) Obsolete, unenforced, or unenforceable laws 
are likely to cause a breakdown of law enforcement in related areas. (4) 
Crimes do not seem to be deterred by severe punishments any more than 
by mild penalties. (5) Despite contrary legal provisions, where different gov-
ernmental units compete in law enforcement, the unit most effectively 
satisfying the "actual wants" of the people will replace the less efficient 
units. 
What Professor Beutel does in Part II of his book has been indicated 
because he is there engaged in the doing of Experimental Jurisprudence, 
and from this one may secure some idea as to the nature of the enterprise 
and its apparent scientific character. I would but add that what is experi-
mental and scientific in this activity is hardly jurisprudential and what 
is jurisprudential is not shown to be scientific or experimental. This is 
not to suggest that Professor Beutel is wrong to urge that better infor-
mation about the movement of traffic and its response to different con-
trols will produce laws more effective in securing given objectives. Instead, 
I only question why this is thought to make law a science. It could be 
argued, analogously, that morality is made a science [Experimental Mor-
ality (?)] if before deciding whether or not to lie about the death of her 
child to a sick and dying mother, one were to ascertain what happens 
to mothers upon learning about the death of their children. If this study 
into the ways of mothers revealed that blood pressure went up, heart beat 
went down, and pain increased, would that decide whether or not the 
lie should be told? 
This point has perhaps been belabored because it is crucial for the 
entire notion of law as a science; the central question here raised is one 
which Professor Beutel seeks to avoid in Part I of his book where, in of-
fering the theoretical analysis for law as a science, he advises that all 
questions of value are to be eschewed, at least for the present. In Part I 
which consists largely of selections which have previously appeared as law 
review articles, the author first offers a definition of the scientific method 
(pp. 4-5) and then after rejecting Pound's definition of law as the adjust-
ment of social interests (p. 17) Professor Beutel gives the eight steps of 
the method of Experimental Jurisprudence. (p. 18) In explaining the nature 
of Experimental Jurisprudence the author quotes (p. 28) with approval 
from Lundberg's well-known Can Science Save Us, "The only value 
judgments which any properly trained scientist makes about his data are 
judgments regarding their relevance to his problem .... " 
Suspecting as I do that "the scientific method" is very little more than 
providing intelligent men with the funds necessary to pursue investiga-
tions into matters of interest, and that it is hardly like a too-often imag-
ined technique or procedure which can be printed and distributed to 
all graduates of technical schools, it would not be difficult for me to accept 
the notion that one may behave scientifically about lawmaking. But when 
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Professor Beutel argues that there is some sharp line between judgments as 
to what should be the proper distance between planted trees and judg-
ments as to the morality of capital punishment, I find some difficulty in 
appreciating what it is that he understands by "the scientific method," 
and, in turn, what he means by speaking of law as a science. That he thinks 
there is some such sharp line is suggested by his insistence upon rejecting 
all value judgments-an insistence made more puzzling by the failure to 
reveal what are these anti-scientific judgments. 
My difficulties with this attempt to separate "is" and "ought," which 
is what is here involved, were not lessened when Professor Beutel advises 
(p. 63) that a crucial task for the experimental jurist is to discover not 
general theories advanced to explain the purposes of government, but 
rather to discover "the effect of a particular law in accomplishing the 
real purpose for which it was created." (Italics added.) Nor is there comfort 
to be gained when we are advised that the experimental jurist is to take 
account of human needs and demands, but these only as "objectively dis-
cernible by social research." (p. 395) 
It is somewhat disconcerting to imagine that man's needs and demands 
for warmth, love, companionship, and freedom are to receive legal recog-
nition by the new lawmakers as envisaged by the experimental jurist only 
to the extent that they are "objectively discernible" by science. Were 
this to become the case, one would indeed wish to know, Who researches 
the researchers? That Professor Beutel does place an improper emphasis 
upon science and its role even in a creative society is strongly suggested 
when he writes that the "democratic process . . . is not adapted to social 
change" based upon scientific ideas (p. 73) because only six percent of 
the population have bachelor degrees in science and can thus "hope to 
comprehend the implications of scientific developments or to construct 
means whereby they can be adapted to the use of the legal and govern-
mental machinery. If, therefore, sufficient public interest is to be developed 
in adopting new scientific methods, it will be necessary for this small 
nucleus from which came the able scientists to convince the great ma-
jority to agree to types of governmental and legal devices which the 
overwhelming mass of people cannot even understand." (p. 75) It is sub-
mitted that the reasons for questioning this line of argument are apparent. 
To conclude only on this note of criticism would be unfair to a book 
which is a pioneering effort and which does contain much that is laud-
able. I am referring to the actual study of the functioning of law in society, 
as illustrated by Professor Beutel's investigations into the bad check prob-
lem. As already indicated, there is, I'm sure, none who doubt the need for 
such researches. What has here been questioned has been the theoretical 
superstructure which Professor Beutel apparently considers to be a necessity 
for such researches. 
Samuel I. Shuman, 
Professor of Law, 
Wayne State University 
